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INTRODUCTION

A.

In General

How did the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit fare
with its trademark decisions in 1992? The decisions were middleof-the-trademark-road, reflecting a conservative but not stodgy approach to trademark law. Although trademark cases occupy only
about five percent of its docket,' almost all on appeal from the
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (the Board), 2 the court showed
a keen grasp of the field and a strong respect for established trademark rights. The court was not particularly innovative, with no bold
or stunning breakthroughs. But neither was it timid, slavishly following precedent where the facts dictated otherwise. In the end, it
took the cases one at a time, recognizing a principle many practitioners still refuse to believe: each trademark case must be decided
on its own set of facts.
B.

Likelihood of Confusion

In a trademark infringement case, an opposition or a cancellation
proceeding, the central issue is whether an appreciable segment of
the public is likely to be confused upon encountering the defendant's mark on goods or in connection with services. 3 In the Federal
Circuit, unlike most other circuits, likelihood of confusion is
1. Judge Paul Michel, Language and the Law, Address Before the 1992 United States
Trademark Association Midyear Meeting (Nov. 14, 1992).
2. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office describes the Trademark Trial and Appeal
Board as "the USPTO administrative tribunal that hears and decides (1) appeals from examining attorneys' final refusals to allow registrations of trademarks, and (2) certain inter parles
proceedings." COMM'R OF PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS, ANNUAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR 1991
(Apr. 1992) [hereinafter PTO 1991 ANNUAL REPORT].
3. See I JEROME GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 5.01[1], at 5-6 to -7
(1992) (introducing basic scenarios in which likelihood of confusion issue arises in trademark
infringement cases).
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deemed a question of law, which the court reviews de novo. 4 By contrast, underlying factual findings such as trademark similarity or
trade channel overlap are reviewed under the "clearly erroneous"
standard set forth in rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 5 In most other circuits, likelihood of confusion is deemed an
issue of fact and is reviewed only for clear error. 6 The Federal Circuit thus has far greater latitude than most other circuits in reviewing trademark cases. In theory, an appellant before the Federal
Circuit arguing that the Board erred in deciding the issue has a
lower threshold to overcome.
In reviewing Board decisions addressing the issue of likelihood of
confusion, the Federal Circuit pays close attention to the so-called
DuPont factors. 7 Twenty years ago, the Federal Circuit's predecessor court, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, enumerated
the factors to be considered in reviewing the evidence. 8 Essentially,
4. See id. § 8.14, at 8-346 (describing de novo review as court judgment, independent of
Board decision, based on all pertinent information).
5. See Electronic Design & Sales, Inc. v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 954 F.2d 713, 715,
21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1388, 1390 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (applying "clearly erroneous" test to Board
finding of likely confusion between maker of power supplies and provider of computer services); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) (providing for fact finding and review).
6. See la GILsON, supra note 3, § 8.14, at 8-340 (observing that "clear majority" of circuit courts uphold lower court decisions absent clear error).
7. See I GILSON, supra note 3, § 5.01[3], at 5-18 n.20 (noting that Federal Circuit has
continued to rely on DuPont factors).
8. See In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (providing factors). The court in DuPont stated that the reviewing
court should consider the following 13 factors (the "DuPont factors"):
(1) The similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to appearance,
sound, connotation and commercial impression.
(2) The similarity or dissimilarity and nature of the goods or services as described
in an application or registration or in connection with which a prior mark is in
use.
(3) The similarity or dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue trade channels.
(4) The conditions under which and buyers to whom sales are made, i.e. "impulse" vs. careful, sophisticated purchasing.
(5) The fame of the prior mark (sales, advertising, length of use).
(6) The number and nature of similar marks in use on similar goods.
(7) The nature and extent of any actual confusion.
(8) The length of time during and conditions under which there has been concurrent use without evidence of actual confusion.
(9) The variety of goods on which a mark is or is not used (house mark, "family"
mark, product mark).
(10) The market interface between applicant and the owner of a prior mark:
(a) a mere "consent" to register or use.
(b) agreement provisions designed to preclude confusion, i.e., limitations on
continued use of the marks by each party.
(c) assignment of mark, application, registration and good will of the related
business.
(d) laches and estoppel attributable to owner of prior mark and indicative of
lack of confusion.
(11) The extent to which applicant has a !ight to exclude others from use of its
mark on its goods.
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the factors focus on similarity, fame, and market conditions. 9

In 1992, the Federal Circuit embellished the traditional test for
likelihood of confusion in several important ways. For example, the
court reached down and plucked "fame of the prior mark" from the
DuPont factors and breathed new life into it, stressing the strong
protectibility of famous trademarks. 10 The court fine-tuned the concept of overlapping purchasers, a common indicator of confusion

likelihood, by looking inside corporations to determine who really
purchases the products. 11 And, in a return to questionable authority, the Federal Circuit in Kenner Parker Toys Inc. v. Rose Art Industries,
Inc. 12 accorded weight to a defendant's similar trade dress 13 even
though the central issue was whether the defendant's word and design trademark was confusingly similar to the plaintiff's. 14 Collectively, these and the other trademark decisions of the year represent
not a watershed year, but a year of Federal Circuit trademark law
stability, a year that will be remembered for the court's largely wellreasoned, sensible decisions. In only a few cases, as we shall see,
could the court have done better in choosing applicable law or articulating a legal standard for the guidance of the trademark
community.
C.

The DuPont Factors-Time to Modernize?

The DuPont case, that twenty-year old piece ofjudicial legislation,
played a large role, as it usually does, in the court's determination of
trademark likelihood of confusion. The Federal Circuit turns to the
Restatement-like, now-venerable checklist of factors to guide it in
(12)
(13)

The extent of potential confusion, i.e., whether de minimis or substantial.
Any other established fact probative of the effect of use.

Id.
9. See id (providing factors).
10. See infra notes 34-38 and accompanying text (discussing trademark fame as factor in
likelihood of confusion analysis).
11. See infra notes 167-85 and accompanying text (discussing Federal Circuit decision in
Electronic Design, in which court looked beyond corporate purchasers and considered likelihood of confusion for individual purchasing agents within corporations).
12. 963 F.2d 350, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1453 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 181
(1992).
13. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753, 2755 n.l (1992) (noting
that "trade dress" is defined as "the total image of the business" or product and citing John
W. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 980, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 515, 528 (11 th
Cir. 1983); Harland, 711 F.2d at 980, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 528 (defining "trade dress" as
"the total image of a product and may include features such as size, shape, color or color
combination, texture, graphics, or even particular sales techniques").
14. Kenner Parker Toys Inc. v. Rose Art Indus., Inc., 963 F.2d 350, 352, 22 U.S.P.Q2d
(BNA) 1453, 1455 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 181 (1992); see infra notes 80-88 and
accompanying text (criticizing Federal Circuit's use of trade dress in likelihood of confusion
analysis).
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comparing trademarks in the context of marketplace realities.15 The
facts and holding of the DuPont case have faded into obscurity, but
the checklist lives on, as influential as ever. Indeed, in the world of
trademark litigation before the Board and the court, "DuPont" has
achieved secondary meaning. It no longer means petroleum operations, polymers, fibers, and chemicals; it means likelihood of confusion factors. And what degree of importance does the court place
on the DuPont checklist? In the court's view, when there is relevant
evidence of record, the checklist factors are no less than
"mandatory."' 6
The DuPont checklist forces the court to review the many applicable factors in a systematic way in answering the eternal question: is
the defendant's trademark likely to cause confusion? Now second
nature to the court, the checklist is a flexible guide that must be
consulted in each trademark case. Because of the diverse fact situations in cases coming before the court, the DuPont factors are not all
relevant or entitled to the same weight in each case. The court has
considerable latitude in applying the factors.' 7 But the DuPont
checklist has not changed in two decades and probably hundreds of
cases. Is it not time for the court to take steps to modernize it?
The DuPont checklist works well in general and does not require a
major overhaul. The enumerated factors will always be relevant on
the likelihood of confusion factors, absent a Lanham Act amendment or other unanticipated change in the law. But the factors are
not static. They have, in effect, been modified or supplemented by
decisions of the court in subtle and not-so-subtle ways. It makes
sense to fine-tune the checklist from time to time as the court's decisions indicate, and the court should be alert to these possibilities
and make appropriate changes from year to year. The trademark
community and the public would benefit from an updated list of factors that reflect the current views of the court. One would never
know from reading DuPont, for example, that trade dress can be an
15. See, e.g., Kenner Parker, 963 F.2d at 353, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1455-56 (considering
DuPont factors); Olde Tyme Foods, Inc. v. Roundy's Inc., 961 F.2d 200, 202, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1542, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (observing that DuPont factors for analyzing likelihood of
confusion were mandatory); Kellogg Co. v. Pack'em Enters., Inc., 951 F.2d 330, 332, 21
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1142, 1144 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (turning to DuPont factors for likelihood of
confusion analysis and noting that factors must be considered if record contains evidence that
allows application of factors).
16. See Olde Tyme Foods, 961 F.2d at 202, 22 U.S.P.O.2d (BNA) at 1544 (emphasis added)
(citing compulsory nature ofDuPont factors); Kellogg, 951 F.2d at 332, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1144 (mandating use of DuPont factors in likelihood of confusion analyses).
17. See In re DuPont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1362, 177 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 563,
567-68 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (permitting factors to be weighed differently as required by facts of
particular case).
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important factor in a case where a comparison of word trademarks is
the focus. 18 The American Law Institute revises Restatements from
time to time to reflect changes in the law.19 Why does the court not
do the same with DuPont? It could well choose a 1993 case for finetuning purposes. 20 1992 provided several possibilities.
D. Summary Judgments
Only a tiny percentage of Board decisions reach the court, and
many of these are decided on motions for summary judgment. In
fiscal 1991, 3813 interpartes cases 2 1 were filed with the Board: 894
cancellation petitions and 2919 oppositions. 22 Through settlement,
by default, or on summary judgment motion, the Board disposed of
3123 cases. 23 Under rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment in advance of trial is appropriate where
there is no issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. 2 4 The Board spent substantial time in
fiscal 1991 on summary judgment motions and disposed of more
than 150 cases involving contested motions. 2 5 In fact, approximately half of all interpartes decisions written by Board members in
fiscal 1991 were decisions on summary judgment- motions. 26 In
turn, a substantial part of the trademark business of the Federal Circuit consists of deciding cases on appeal from these decisions. Of
the fourteen Federal Circuit trademark appeals decided in 1992,
four were appeals from Board rulings on summary judgment in inter
27
partes cases.
18. See Kenner Parker,963 F.2d at 355-56, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1458 (discussing trade
dress similarities and concluding that similarities increase likelihood of confusion from similar
word marks).
19. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION (Tent. Drafts Nos. 2 & 3,
1990-1991) (providing currently proposed revisions).
20. Within the next several years, the court should be faced with numerous unanswered
questions of statutory interpretation involving the Trademark Law Revision Act, Pub. L. No.
100-667, 102 Stat. 3935 (1988) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). For
example, what conduct qualifies for a "bona fide intent to use" trademark application under
15 U.S.C. § 1051(b)? A DuPont-type checklist for this range of new questions based on the
legislative history of the Act would be extremely helpful to the bar, the public, and the courts.
Because of its success with the DuPont factors, the Federal Circuit would be the logical court
to adopt such a checklist.
21. See PTO 1991 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 40 (defining inter partes cases as "cases
involving opposition to granting registration of marks and petitions to cancel existing
registrations").
22. PTO 1991 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 76.
23. PTO 1991 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 76.
24. See FED. R. CIv. P. 56(c) (stating criteria for summary judgment).
25. See PTO 1991 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 41 (reviewing fiscal 1991).
26. PTO 1991 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 41.
27. See Lincoln Logs Ltd. v. Lincoln Pre-Cut Log Homes, Inc., 971 F.2d 732, 736, 23
U.S.P Q.2d (BNA) 1701, 1705 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (affirming Board's conclusion that trademark
term LINCOLN would improperly connect respondent's homes with petitioner's toys); Opry-
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The Board batted .500 on these cases. The court affirmed the
Board twice and reversed it twice. But despite the upsurge in Board
summary judgments, the Federal Circuit took pains in 1992 to remind the Board, and all others, that summary judgment motions
must still be denied where there are issues of material fact. 28 Any
belief that the Board and the court have a high degree of tolerance
for such motions and a willingness to decide them without ferreting
out triable issues of material fact was dashed in 1992. Rule 56 still
has vitality, issues of material fact still require a trial, and summary
judgments are inappropriate where such issues exist or where the
factual inferences drawn from the evidence favor the nonmoving
party.
II.

TRADEMARK FAME IN THE LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION ANALYSIS

From time to time, the court singles out one of the DuPont likelihood of confusion factors and gives it special emphasis. Last year,
for example, in Kellogg Co. v. Pack'em Enterprises, Inc.,29 the court affirmed a Board summary judgment decision by holding that, based
on the single DuPont factor of trademark similarity in sound, appearance, and meaning, the trademark FROOTEE ICE and design was
not likely to cause confusion with respect to the trademark FRUIT
LOOPS.3 0 The court gave considerable deference to the Board, ap-

parently encouraging the Board to grant more summary judgment
motions based on trademark similarity alone. 3 1 After all, what
speedier way is there to dispose of a backlog of cases?
This year the court concentrated on trademark fame, 32 a consistently important component in the likelihood of confusion calculus
land USA Inc. v. Great American Music Show, Inc., 970 F.2d 847, 851, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1471, 1474 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (remanding to Board for further analysis on issue of whether
phrase CAROLINA OPRY would cause confusion); Loglan Inst., Inc. v. Logical Language
Group, Inc., 962 F.2d 1038, 1040-42, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(affirming Board decision that LOGLAN is generic word describing certain language and
therefore not registrable as trademark); Olde Tyme Foods, Inc. v. Roundy's Inc., 961 F.2d
200, 203, 22 U.S.P.O_2d (BNA) 1542, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (remanding to Board for redetermination of whether trademark terms YE OLDE TYME and OLD TIME are sufficiently confusing to warrant cancellation of former mark).
28. See Opryland USA, 970 F.2d at 851-53, 23 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA) at 1474-75 (finding sufficient issues of material fact regarding public's perception of litigants' entertainment services
to resist motion for summary judgment); Olde Tyme Foods, 961 F.2d at 202, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1544 (reversing Board's grant of summary judgment on ground that Board failed to
consider inferences indicating no confusion in favor of nonmovant).
29. 951 F.2d 330, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1142 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
30. Kellogg Co. v. Pack'em Enters., Inc., 951 F.2d 330, 332-33, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1142, 1144 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
31. See id., 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1145 (approving Board's summary judgment motion
against registrant due to dissimilarity).
32. See I GILSON, supra note 3, § 5.05[3], at 5-74 to -77 (explaining importance of public
awareness in likelihood of confusion analysis and defining trademark fame); see also RESTATE-
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and the fifth DuPont factor.3 3 Fame is the essence of a trademark's
commercial magnetism, the quality that makes the deepest and
broadest penetration into the public consciousness.3 4 The greater
the fame, the greater the likelihood that a court will grant protection
of the mark, even as against noncompeting products.3 5 It is no surprise, therefore, that courts granted injunctions against ROLLSROYCE radio tubes3 6 and DUNHILL scotch whiskey.3 7 Why? Purchasers are likely to assume that such products are simply extensions of original brand-name product lines or are licensed by or
otherwise associated with the trademark owner. Even where likelihood of confusion is inapplicable, as in a straight dilution case,3 8
trademark fame is critical. It defines the degree of distinctiveness
that is subject to being whittled away.
What, then, did the Federal Circuit add to this subject last year?
As it turned out, quite a bit.
A.

Kenner Parker Toys Inc. v. Rose Art Industries, Inc.

Trademark fame was the centerpiece of Kenner Parker Toys Inc. v.
Rose Art Industries, Inc. ,39 perhaps the most important trademark case
the Federal Circuit decided in 1992. Kenner Parker owned five federal registrations, four of which were incontestable, for the mark
40
PLAY-DOH for modeling compounds and related accessories.
Kenner Parker opposed Rose Art's application to register
FUNDOUGH as a trademark for the same kinds of products-modeling compounds and related accessories. 4 1 The Board dismissed
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2 1(d) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1990) (including trademark
distinctiveness as factor in determining likelihood of confusion).
33. See supra note 8 (listing DuPont likelihood of confusion factors).
34. See I GILSON, supra note 3, § 5.0513], at 5-74 to -77 (emphasizing significance of
trademark fame to public's perception of product).
35. See Kenner Parker Toys Inc. v. Rose Art Indus., Inc., 963 F.2d 350, 353, 22
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1453, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (discussing precedents affording greater protection to famous marks, as required by Lanham Act).
36. See Wall v. Rolls-Royce of Am., Inc., 4 F.2d 333, 333-34 (3d Cir. 1925) (enjoining
Rolls-Royce Tube Company from using name "Rolls-Royce" in order to prevent confusion
with automaker of same name).
37. See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Kasser Distillers Prods. Corp., 350 F. Supp.
1341, 1369, 175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 586, 605-06 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (denying distiller use of"Dunhill" name due to potential public belief that distiller was associated with famous tobacco
company), aff'd per curiam, 480 F.2d 917, 178 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 449 (3d Cir. 1973).
38. See 1 GILSON,supra note 3, § 5.05[9], at 5-90 (defining dilution of trademark as "the
'gradual whittling away' of its distinctiveness through use by third parties on nonconfusing,
noncompeting products") (quoting Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Tradeinark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REv. 813, 825 (1927)).
39. 963 F.2d 350, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1453 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 181
(1992).
40. Kenner Parker Toys Inc. v. Rose Art Indus., Inc., 963 F.2d 350, 351, 22 U.S.P.,2d
(BNA) 1453, 1454 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 181 (1992).
41. Id. at 351-52, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1455.
MENT
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Kenner Parker's opposition.42 It held that there was no likelihood
of confusion between FUNDOUGH and PLAY-DOH. 43 Curiously,
44
the Board treated the fame of Kenner Parker's mark as a liability.
It relied on a statement made by the Federal Circuit in B. VD. Licensing Corp. v. Body Action Design, Inc.4 5 to the effect that "[t]he fame of a
mark cuts both ways with respect to likelihood of confusion. The
better known it is, the more readily the public becomes aware of
even a small difference." '4 6 The Board reasoned that confusion
tended to be unlikely because the public was able to detect the dis47
similarities in the marks.
The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that the parties' marks were
quite similar and the respective goods directly competitive. 48 Moreover, it held that the fame of the PLAY-DOH mark magnified rather
than reduced the significance of the similarities. 49 The Federal Circuit criticized the Board for misreading the B. VD. case and taking
the statement out of context. The court emphasized that it had consistently afforded strong trademarks "a wider latitude of legal protection than weak marks" 50 and cited cases to prove it.51 But then
the court backpedaled, realizing that the statement could have been
interpreted as the Board did, and therefore noted that "[t]he holding of B. VD., to the extent it treats fame as a liability, is confined to
52
the facts of that case."
In 1988 Kenner Parker's sales of PLAY-DOH products exceeded
$30 million, and the company spent over $2 million in advertisement and promotion.5 3 Kenner Parker introduced testimony, not
surprising to most parents, that one of every two children aged two
to seven owned a PLAY-DOH product. 5 4 The company also submitted a survey that showed sixty percent of mothers named PLAY55
DOH modeling compound without any prompting whatsoever.
For these reasons, the Federal Circuit and the Board concluded that
42. Kenner Parker Toys Inc. v. Rose Art Indus., Inc., Opp. No. 75,237, slip op. at 13
(T.T.A.B. Mar. 20, 1986).
43. Id. at 8.
44. Ia at 11-12.
45. 846 F.2d 727, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1719 (Fed. Cir. 1988); see infra notes 157-60 and
accompanying text (discussing B.VD. case and judicial notice of trademark fame).
46. B.V.D. Licensing Corp. v. Body Action Design, Inc., 846 F.2d 727, 729, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1719, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
47. Id, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1721.
48. Kenner Parker, 963 F.2d at 355-56, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1458.
49. Id. at 352-55, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1456-58.
50. Ia at 354, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1457.
51. See id., 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1457 (citing precedent before and after B. V.D. case).
52. Id.
53. Ia at 351, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1455.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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the PLAY-DOH mark was famous, but the court found that the
Board erred in discounting the importance of the mark's fame. 56
Kenner Parker filed its opposition based on likelihood of confusion under section 2(d) of the Lanham Act,5 7 and the Federal Circuit
dutifully reviewed the likelihood of confusion factors set forth in DuPont.5 8 Of the thirteen factors, the Federal Circuit emphasized the
fame of the prior mark. 59 The court observed that famous or strong
marks enjoy a wide latitude of legal protection and that after trademark fame and consumer trust are established, the mark is often
subject to exploitation. 60 A competitor can quickly obtain economic
advantage by trying to "snuggle as close as possible to a famous
mark," a proximity the court simply was not willing to accept.6 1 The
court issued a blunt warning: "A strong mark . . . casts a long
shadow which competitors must avoid."'6 2 It went on to describe the
protection afforded famous marks in an inverse formula: "As a
mark's fame increases, the Act's tolerance for similarities in compet' 63
ing marks falls."
How did the Board go wrong in treating the fame of the PLAYDOH mark as a liability, instead of as an asset? Based on its analysis
of B. VD., the Board thought that consumers would more easily recognize variations of a famous mark and that the fame of the PLAYDOH mark permitted greater legal tolerance for similarity. 6.1 In
other words, the Board reasoned that because the PLAY-DOH mark
was famous, consumers could easily distinguish between it and a
somewhat similar mark. 65 The Federal Circuit disagreed, sidestepping its B. V.D. statement. It noted the public policy rationale that
trademarks benefit producers who build up goodwill in their trademarks and consumers who rely on them. 6 6 Kenner Parker had in56.
57.

Id. at 353, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1456.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (1988) (prohibiting registration of trademark if it is confus-

ingly similar to another registered or previously used mark). The Lanham Act is the popular
name for the Trademark Act of 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.).
58. Kenner Parker, 963 F.2d at 352-56, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1456-58.
59. See id at 352-55, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1456-58 (applying trademark fame analysis
to PLAY-DOH and concluding that fame enhances trademark protection). After analyzing the
fame aspect, the court concluded with a cursory examination of several other DuPont factors.
Id. at 355-56, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1458; see infra notes 74-79 (providing further discussion
of court's decision in Kenner Parker).
60. Kenner Parker, 963 F.2d at 353, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1456.
61.
62.
63.

Id.
Id.
Id.

64. Kenner Parker Toys Inc. v. Rose Art Indus., Inc., Opp. No. 75,237, slip op. at 11-12
(T.T.A.B. Mar. 20, 1986).
65.

Id.

66. See Kenner Parker, 963 F.2d at 353, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1456-57 (stating that "(a]
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vested massive amounts of money to establish PLAY-DOH goodwill,
and consumers recognized the mark as symbolizing superior products for children. 67 It would be absurd to decrease the protection of
a trademark at the same time a company succeeded in increasing the
fame of the mark.6 8 Thus, the court reasoned, as the fame of a mark
69
increases, so too does the protection against similar marks.
But what happens when the senior user of a famous trademark
allows a junior user to build up rights in its mark to the point where
it, too, becomes famous? Does the senior user win a contest between the marks, with the Board giving it the protection accorded
famous marks by the rationale of Kenner Parker? In Marshall Field &
Co. v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 70 the Board, post-Kenner Parker, answered
this question in the negative. It held that both the petitioner's mark,
MARSHALL FIELD'S, and the registrant's mark, MRS. FIELDS,
were famous: MARSHALL FIELD'S for department store services
and MRS. FIELDS for cookies. 71 The Board found that the fame of
both marks made them readily distinguishable by the public. 72 Does
the Board's reasoning square with Kenner Parker? It does. Because
the respective marks were famous in unrelated businesses, the
Board correctly ruled that the parties' goodwill encompassed their
respective areas of fame and that the public recognized the marks as
symbolizing quality products in different fields. 73 Marshall Field did
not appeal the Board decision holding that there was no likelihood
of confusion.
Once the Federal Circuit found that the PLAY-DOH mark was famous in Kenner Parker,it applied other relevant DuPont factors to find
likelihood of confusion. 7 4 In analyzing the similarity of PLAY-DOH
trademark's 'function is simply to designate the goods as the product of a particular trader
and to protect his good will against the sale of another's product as his' ") (quoting United
Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918)).
67. See id. at 351, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1455 (detailing Kenner's advertising investment in PLAY-DOH and public's widespread acceptance of PLAY-DOH mark).
68. See id. at 354, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1457 (observing that law would be "schizophrenic" to countenance disincentive to trademark investment where increased fame yields
decreased protection).
69. See id. (concluding that Lanham Act gives greater protection as fame increases).
70. 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (T.T.A.B. 1992).
71. Marshall Field & Co. v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1332
(T.T.A.B. 1992).
72. Id
73. Id. The Marshall Field decision suggests that the fifth DuPont factor should be modified to read: "The fame of the prior and subsequent marks (sales, advertising, length of use)."
See id. at 1331-34 (discussing fame of both marks and finding confusion unlikely), see also supra
note 8 (setting forth DuPont factors).
74. See Kenner Parker Toys Inc. v. Rose Art Indus., Inc., 963 F.2d 350, 354-56, 22
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1453, 1457-58 (Fed. Cir.) (considering nature of goods, trade channels,
length of use, and trade dress in analyzing likelihood of confusion), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 181
(1992).
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and FUNDOUGH, the court explained that the prefixes PLAY- and
FUN- conveyed a similar impression, especially in the context of a
child's plaything. 75 Furthermore, the suffixes -DOH and -DOUGH
sound alike, and "doh" is a simplified spelling of "dough. ' 7 6 The
Federal Circuit also observed that in the context of a far less famous
mark, FUN FACTORY, the Board had properly concluded that
PLAY FACTORY was confusingly similar. 77 The court went on to
state that the marks were used on practically identical, inexpensive
products, sold in practically identical channels of trade, to buyers
not exercising a great deal of care. 78 Finally, the court reaffirmed
the longstanding doctrine that any doubt about confusing similarity
79
should be resolved against the newcomer.
While singing the praises of famous trademarks and drawing applause from most trademark quarters, the court in Kenner Parker did
revive a questionable premise. The competing products were of
similar size, shape, and color, and both were packaged featuring fictitious characters wearing hats. 0 Moreover, both companies offered similar discounts, rebates, and promotions accompanied by
similar designs.8 1 The court, struck by the magnitude of the similarity, stated that it "cries out for recognition. ' 8 2 But even though the
court recognized that accompanying trade dress can always be
changed and is generally not relevant in a word trademark case, it
went on to state that the trade dress of record may provide supplemental evidence beyond the word marks of whether the challenged
mark creates a likelihood of confusion.8 3 In doing so, the court used
the trade dress similarity to bolster its conclusion that the word
84
marks were confusingly similar.
Although the court had precedent for this holding,8 5 it reopened
a trademark Pandora's box that could well have remained closed.
One searches the DuPont checklist in vain for any reference to trade
75. Id., 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1457.
76. Id. at 355, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1457.
77. See id., 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1458 (citing General Mills Fun Group, Inc. v. Channel Cos., 183 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 367 (T.T.A.B. 1974)).
78. Id at 355-56, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1458.
79. Id. at 355, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1458.
80. Id.
81. Id
82. Id
83. See id. (citing Specialty Brands, Inc. v. Coffee Bean Distribs., Inc., 748 F.2d 669, 671,
223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1281, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
84. See it at 355-56, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1458 (concluding that marks' similar trade
dress increased overall similarity).
85. See Specialty Brands, 748 F.2d at 672-74, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1282-84 (weighing
trade dress as significant factor in likelihood of confusion case).
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dress used in conjunction with a word trademark.8 6 It is conspicuously absent. Certainly, the Board and the Federal Circuit should
not wear blinders in deciding trademark cases. At the same time,
they are not as well equipped to decide trade dress cases as the federal district courts, which are presented with all of the evidence as to
similarity, wrongful intent, and functionality, and which can consider the total image of a product or a business. Finally, opening
the door to this kind of collateral inquiry raises the need to conduct
the inquiry fully, consistently, fairly, and even-handedly. For example, the Board should allow the admission of consumer survey or
other public reaction evidence by either party on the extent to which
the accompanying trade dress does or does not augment the conclusion based on the word marks alone.
In most of the reported cases where the Board or the court relied
on surrounding trade dress in a word mark case, it did so in support
of a finding that confusion was likely.8 7 Yet, if trade dress can help
prove confusing similarity, it can just as well help disprove it. There
is no reason why a defendant should be deprived of relying on dissimilar trade dress accompanying an allegedly similar word mark.
The court should either expressly embrace this principle, opening
the door wide, or it should discontinue considering trade dress in
word mark cases. If the court prefers the former, it should serve
notice on litigants and the public in a future case by adopting another DuPont factor to cover the principle.8 8
B.

Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of America

Trademark fame was also a centerpiece in Century 21 Real Estate
Corp. v. Century Life of America,8 ° a Kenner Parker done. In that case,
the Federal Circuit reversed the Board, holding that it improperly
86. See supra note 8 (providing DuPont factors).
87. See, e.g., Kenner Parker, 963 F.2d at 355, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1458 (finding trade
dress to be one factor in determination that confusion was likely in children's modeling compound case); Specialty Brands, 748 F.2d at 673-74, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1284 (including trade
dress in determination of likely confusion for tea trademarks); Indianapolis Motor Speedway
Corp. v. Battery Sys. Inc., Opp. No. 73,969, slip op. at 1-12 (T.T.A.B. Nov. 10, 1988) (considering trade dress in dispute over vehicular battery trademarks and concluding that confusion
was likely); Roger & Gallet S.A. v. Venice Trading Co., 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1829, 1832
(T.T.A.B. 1987) (using trade dress to find likelihood of confusion in case involving hair care
products). But see Northwestern Golf Co. v. Acushnet Co., 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 240, 244
(T.T.A.B. 1985) (finding no likelihood of confusion notwithstanding similarity of trade dress
in golf club trademark case).
88. For example, the factor might provide: "(14) the similarity or dissimilarity of trade
dress accompanying a word trademark, insofar as it enhances the mark's commercial
impression."
89. 970 F.2d 874, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1698 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 812
(1992).
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applied the likelihood of confusion analysis. 9 0 Century 21 had registered its CENTURY 21 mark for real estate brokerage, insurance
brokerage, and mortgage brokerage services. 9 1 In addition, a Century 21 customer could obtain automobile, umbrella liability, life,
and health insurance from the company.9 2 Century 21 opposed

Century Life's registration of CENTURY LIFE OF AMERICA for
insurance underwriting services. 93
Consistent with its ruling in Kenner Parker, the Board had recognized the fame of the CENTURY 21 mark, but suggested that this
factor weighed against a likelihood of confusion. 94 Predictably, the
Federal Circuit followed its decision in Kenner Parker and held that a

mark's fame cannot lower its protection against similar marks. 95
The court noted that Century 21 had more real estate affiliates than
any other franchisor, had $55 billion in gross sales under its mark in

1987, and had spent nearly $300 million on advertising since
1978.96 The Board, handing down its decision before the Federal
Circuit decided Kenner Parker, erred in holding that the fame of
CENTURY 21 actually reduced the likelihood of confusion. 9 7
In addition to highlighting the fifth DuPont factor, the Federal Circuit determined that the first, second, third, and sixth factors also
favored a likelihood of confusion. 98 In analyzing similarity, the
court found that CENTURY was the dominant element of both
CENTURY LIFE OF AMERICA and CENTURY 21, and that consumers would identify this element as salient. 9 9 Century 21's other
registrations incorporating CENTURY further underscored the significance of the CENTURY component. 10 0 Century 21 also produced a consumer survey showing a high association between the
CENTURY term and Century 21.101 The Federal Circuit admonished the Board for giving insufficient weight to the parties' use of
similar marks for identical services and applied an established prin90. Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 875, 23
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1698, 1699 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 812 (1992).
91. Id
92. Id
93. Id
94. Id at 877, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1701.
95. See id. (reversing Board and holding that fame of phrase CENTURY 21 increases
likelihood of confusion).
96. Idt at 875, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1699.
97. Idt at 877, 23 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA) at 1701.
98. See id. at 877-78, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1700-01 (considering additional similarity
factors of goods, trade channels, and marks).
99. Id. at 876, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1700.
100. See id. (finding that Century 21's registration of CENTURYNET and CENTURY
WRITE focus attention on CENTURY mark).
101. Id.
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ciple of law, stating that "[w]hen marks would appear on virtually
identical goods or services, the degree of similarity necessary to support a conclusion of likely confusion declines."' 1 2 The court further
criticized the Board for discounting the similarity of trade channels.10 3 The Board had found that the parties advertised in the
same media and offered their services to the same types of purchasers, yet it minimized these similarities.1 0 4 By contrast, the court
ruled that an opposer need only prove similar, not identical, trade
channels. 10 5 Lastly, the court found a paucity of third party CENTURY marks for similar services and then applied its familiar slogan: any doubts must be resolved in favor of the registrant and
10 6
against the newcomer.
C. Opryland USA Inc. v. Great American Music Show, Inc.
In yet another famous mark decision, the court followed its Kenner
Parker protectionist lead, notwithstanding the fact that the famous
mark contained the adjudicated generic term "opry." In Opryland
USA Inc. v. Great American Music Show, Inc.,107 a consolidated cancellation/opposition proceeding, the court vacated the Board's entry
of summary judgment in favor of the registrant/applicant and remanded for further proceedings.' 0 8 Opryland owned a number of
service mark registrations for country music entertainment services,
including GRAND OLD OPRY, OZARK OPRY, OPRYLAND USA,
and OPRYLAND.' 0 9 Opryland alleged that Great American's
marks, THE CAROLINA OPRY and CALVIN GILMORE
PRESENTS THE CAROLINA OP.RY, so resembled its marks for
similar services that confusion was likely and, furthermore, that
Great American's marks falsely suggested a connection with Opryland under section 2(a) of the Lanham Act." 0
102. See id. at 877, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1700 (citing precedents from Second, Fifth,
Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits).
103. Id.
104. Id at 876, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1700.
105. Id at 877, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1701.
106. See id. at 877-78, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1701 (weighing paucity of evidence in opposer's favor).
107. 970 F.2d 847, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1471 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
108. Opryland USA Inc. v. Great American Music Show, Inc., 970 F.2d 847, 849, 23
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1471, 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
109. Id.
110. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (1988). The code provides:
No trade-mark by which the goods of the applicant may be distinguished from the
goods of others shall be refused registration on the principal register on account of
its nature unless it(a) Consists of or comprises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter; or matter
which may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons, living or dead,
institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute.
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The Board granted Great American's summary judgment motion,
holding that there was no likelihood of confusion under section 2(d)
primarily because the Eighth Circuit had held "opry" to be generic
for country music shows in WSM, Inc. v. Hilton.1 11 Because "opry"
was the only element the marks in Optyland USA had in common, the
Board reasoned that the term could not be given any weight in comparing the otherwise dissimilar marks. 1 2 Thus, according to the
Board, confusion was unlikely as a matter of law and there could be
no false suggestion under section 2(a).1 3
The Federal Circuit found that the Board erred in excluding the
word "opry" from its analysis." 4 The court pointed out that the
public absorbs the entirety of the commercial impression of a mark,
not just the separate components." 5 Thus, the Federal Circuit concluded that the Board should have analyzed the marks in their entireties. 1 6 The generic character of "opry," the court noted, was
only one factor to be considered when making this comparison.1 1 7
The court went on to state that the Board should have considered
other evidentiary factors as well, including the fame of the Opryland
marks as developed through use in live performances and on radio
and television." 18 The court reiterated its position advanced in Kenner Parker: a well-known mark is afforded greater legal protection
because similar marks are more readily confused with the familiar
9
mark.
The court also found fault with the Board's denial of Opryland's
request to take discovery on public perception and actual confusion.' 20 Because the facts sought through discovery related to
Opryland's defense against the summary judgment motion, the Federal Circuit asserted that the Board had an obligation to permit discovery or deny the motion under rule 56(f) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.' 2 1 The court therefore vacated the summaryjudg15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (1988).
111. See Opryland USA, 970 F.2d at 850, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1473 (discussing Board's
conclusion that Opryland was collaterally estopped from litigating generic nature of "opry"
and Board's reliance on WSM, Inc. v. Hilton, 724 F.2d 1320, 1329, 221 U.S.P.Q, (BNA) 410,
417 (8th Cir. 1984)). WSM, Inc. was Opryland's predecessor. Opryland USA, 970 F.2d at 853,
23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1475.
112. Opr'land USA, 970 F.2d at 850, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1473.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 851, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1473.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id., 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1474.
118. Id.
119. Id. (citing Kenner Parker Toys Inc. v. Rose Art Indus., Inc., 963 F.2d 350, 352, 22
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1453, 1456 (Fed. Cir.), ceri. denied, 113 S. Ct. 181 (1992)).
120. Id. at 851-53, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1474-75.
121. Id. at 852, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1475 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 56(0). The rule
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ment under both sections 2(a) and 2(d) of the Lanham Act and remanded the case for further proceedings.' 2 2 It also criticized Great
American for filing an unwarranted motion for sanctions.12 3 The
court held that Opryland was justified in taking the position, in light
of changed circumstances, that the WSM decision did not constitute
24
collateral estoppel.1
D.

Olde Tyme Foods, Inc. v. Roundy's Inc.

In Olde Tyme Foods, Inc. v. Roundy's Inc., 12 5 the Federal Circuit reversed the Board's entry of summary judgment for a cancellation
petitioner on the ground that the Board incorrectly drew factual inferences in favor of the petitioner.' 2 6 Roundy's, the petitioner, was
the owner of the registered mark OLD TIME for donuts, rolls, buns,
bread, fruit pies, and ice cream. 1 2 7 Olde Tyme Foods registered the
mark YE OLDE TYME for mixes for making corn bread, donuts,
breads, frying batter, cakes, muffins, tortillas, breading, and cookies. 128 Roundy'si petitioned to cancel the YE OLDE TYME registration based on likelihood of confusion.' 2 9 The Board granted
summary judgment to Roundy's, canceling Olde Tyme Foods' registration on the ground that the mark created a likelihood of
confusion.' 3 0
The Board made a number of factual findings along the way, noting that the marks were phonetically and visually similar, that the
Roundy's mark was relatively strong and well known despite evidence of third party use, and that the lack of actual confusion was
insignificant.13 ' In reversing the Board, the Federal Circuit emphasized that a ruling on a summary judgment motion must view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and
32
draw all reasonable inferences in the nonmoving party's favor.'
states: "Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing [summary judgment] that the
party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit
FED. R. Civ. P. 56(f).
...discovery to be had ....
122. Opryland USA, 970 F.2d at 853, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1475.
123. Id. at 853-54, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1476.
124. See id at 854, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1476 (holding that changes in public perception and usage of "opry" were sufficient to permit Opryland's claim).
125. 961 F.2d 200, 22 U.S.P.O.2d (BNA) 1542 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
126. Olde Tyme Foods, Inc. v. Roundy's Inc., 961 F.2d 200, 201, 206, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1542, 1544, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
127. Id. at 201, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1544.
128. Id. at 201-02, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1544.
129. Id. at 202, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1544.

130. Id
131. Id.
132.

Id (citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)).
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The court then compared OLD TIME and YE OLDE TYME and
gave the benefit of the doubt to Olde Tyme Foods. 13 3 Despite the
phonetic similarities, the court found that a reasonable fact finder
could have found that the marks conveyed different connotations
and commercial impressions.13 4 The court noted that YE distin13 5
guished the marks and OLDE TYME suggested old England.
This conservative approach suggests that the court requires nearidentity in the marks before it will uphold a summary judgment finding the marks similar in sound, appearance, and meaning. The
Board, therefore, will be at risk of reversal if it steps over this very
narrow line.
As to trademark fame and the strength of the Roundy's mark, the
court found that the Board improperly drew the factual inference
against the nonmoving party.' 36 Under DuPont, the quality and
quantity of similar marks in use on similar goods must be considered. 3 7 In Olde Tyme Foods, the record contained evidence of actual
use of such marks that the court found could support an inference
that the Roundy's mark was weak, not strong. 13 8 Thus, the court
concluded that the Board should have resolved the inference in
favor of Olde Tyme Foods.' 3 9
Finally, the court treated unkindly the Board's finding that the
parties did business in different geographic areas.1 40 The court
found that only the headquarters of the parties were geographically
remote, and that there were a number of states where the parties
sold in competition with one another. 14 1 Moreover, the court found
that the Board had incorrectly discounted the absence of proof of
actual confusion during eighteen years of concurrent use. 14 2 Thus,
the Federal Circuit held that the Board incorrectly drew the inference in favor of Roundy's. 143 The court recognized that doubts
133. Id. at 203, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1545.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See id. (stating that registration evidence of similar marks is not relevant in drawing
inference, but agreeing with Olde Tyme Food's contention that actual use must be considered
under DuPont).
138. See id. at 204, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1545 (noting that use of OLD TYME by Olde
Tyme Foods for bread and soft drinks could indicate that Roundy's mark was weak).

139. See id. (holding that inference of mark's strength or weakness should be made against
movant
140.
141.
Illinois,

for summary judgment based on actual use).
Id. at 204-05, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1545-46.
See id. at 204, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1546 (noting that Roundy's did business in
Indiana, West Virginia, Ohio, Kentucky, Michigan, Iowa, Wisconsin, Tennessee, Mis-

souri, and Arkansas, while Old Tyme Foods did business in every state except Alaska, Hawaii,
and Montana).
142. See id. (weighing lack of evidence of actual confusion in favor of Olde Tyme Foods).
143. Ideat 204-05, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1546.
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should be resolved against the newcomer in a cancellation proceeding, but it emphasized that this "tie-breaking rule" could not substitute for evidence.14 4 In reversing and remanding the case, the court
also denied Roundy's request for sanctions and attorney's fees. 14 5
E. Determination of Trademark Fame
The well-settled law that trademark fame is important begs the
question of when and how a trademark becomes famous. In Kenner
Parker, the court did not give any specific clues or guidelines but
instead simply suggested that a famous mark should be very distinctive, have enormous advertising investment, and be associated with
a product of lasting value. 146 Of course, the court had the benefit of
a survey showing that sixty percent of mothers named PLAY-DOH
for modeling compound without prompting, in addition to the fact
that half of the two- to seven-year-old age group owned a PLAYDOH product.' 47 One witness characterized the PLAY-DOH trademark as a unique toy business "piece of gold" that had lasted over
thirty years. 14 8 On these facts, few would dispute that at least
among mothers of children in this age group, the mark and product
were famous.
Nevertheless, the Board and the courts have no yardstick by which
to measure fame in a particular case and, unless a consumer survey
or other extrinsic evidence is available, must rely on subjective judgment. After Kenner Parker, one assumes, more trademark owners
than ever before will claim in interpartescases that their marks are at
least as famous as COCA-COLA. These tribunals will thus be asked
to confer the extraordinary trademark protection benefits of fame
on a regular basis. Is there any way to separate the trademark wheat
from the chaff and draw a bright line in future cases to ensure that
only the rare trademark is entitled to such exalted status? Or do the
tribunals simply rely on their instincts, hunches, and the "I know it
when I see it" approach? In its present form, the fifth DuPont factor
is of little help in defining the trademark fame elements: sales, ad49
vertising, and length of use.'
144. Id. at 205, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1546-47.
145. See id at 205-06, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1547 (holding Olde Tyme Foods' ignorance of trade channel precedents insufficiently egregious to merit awarding of sanctions or
attorney's fees and finding that Olde Tyme Foods' appeal raised reviewable issue of law).
146. See Kenner Parker Toys Inc. v. Rose Art Indus., Inc., 963 F.2d 350, 351, 22
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1453, 1455 (Fed. Cir.) (citing sales figures, marketing scheme, and widespread acceptance to indicate success of PLAY-DOH mark), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 181 (1992);
supra notes 53-69 and accompanying text (discussing trademark fame in Kenner Parker).
147. Kenner Parker, 963 F.2d at 351, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1455.
148. Id.
149. See supra note 8 (providing DuPont factors).
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There are only a few approaches for determining whether a trademark is famous. The first is the Kenner Parker ad hoc approach,
where the court reviews the record of trademark exposure to relevant purchasers through product sales, advertising, or publicity.' 50
The greater the exposure, the received wisdom goes, the greater the
likelihood that the mark will make a dent in the consumer consciousness and be remembered. 5 1 But the court in Kenner Parker had
much more: a consumer survey showing sixty percent unaided recognition, 15 2 clearly enough to establish fame for purposes of granting extraordinary trademark protection.
Ordinarily, consumer surveys come closest to establishing trademark fame in litigation when they are offered to prove secondary
meaning. 153 A term that is not inherently distinctive, such as a descriptive term, can become registrable and entitled to trademark
protection if it attains secondary meaning by becoming recognizable
to the public as an identification of a source. 154 Proof of secondary
meaning entails the same kinds of proof typically involved in proving fame: evidence of sales, advertising, and length of use. 155 But is
secondary meaning synonymous with fame, so that if one is proved,
the other is proved automatically? Probably not. Establishing
trademark recognition as a bare minimum hardly seems to reach the
threshold of trademark fame, whatever that threshold turns out to
be.
Does a famous trademark necessarily have secondary meaning?
Yes, if the mark is not inherently distinctive in the first place; no, if it
is inherently distinctive.' 56 In the latter situation, there would be no
secondary meaning because the primary meaning of the mark is
150. See Kenner Parker,963 F.2d at 351-52, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454-55 (noting statistics indicating success of Kenner Parker marketing techniques).
151. See id. at 353, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1456 (discussing importance of exposure of
mark to public in order to ensure consumer awareness).
152. Id. at 351, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1455.
153. See 1 GILSON, supra note 3, § 2.09[5][b], at 2-126 (explaining use of surveys in trademark litigation as best source of direct evidence of secondary meaning).
154. See 1 GILSON, supra note 3, § 2.09[5], at 2-114 (defining secondary meaning as "the
association in the public mind between a product and its source which occurs when an inherently nondistinctive designation... changes from being nondistinctive to being distinctive of
the particular product"). For a more detailed discussion of secondary meaning, see Willajeanne F. McLean, The Birth, Death, and Renaissance of the Doctrine of Secondary Meaning in the
Making, 42 Am. U. L. REv. 737 (1993).
155. See 1 G.soN, supra note 3, § 2.09[5], at 2-124 (listing direct and secondary methods
of proving secondary meaning).
156. See 1 GILSON, supra note 3, § 2.09[1], at 2-111 to -113 (explaining that inherently
distinctive marks do not require proof of secondary meaning "because they instantaneously
convey trademark meaning," but marks that are not inherently distinctive must have secondary meaning "because at the outset the primary meaning which they convey to the public
may not be trademark meaning").
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identification of a source. Thus, in future cases the safest course for
the trademark owner is to introduce a survey specifically demonstrating fame, which necessarily would encompass secondary
meaning.
Judicial notice is the second approach for determining the fame of
a mark. In B.VD. Licensing Corp. v. Body Action Design, Inc.,1 5 7 the
Federal Circuit took judicial notice of a mark's fame in a dispute
involving the B.V.D. trademark, a mark in use for decades and
"'practically a household word."' 5 8 The court relied primarily on
the appearance of the mark in dictionaries and observed that the
mark was widely, if not universally, known.' 59 But is this approach
workable on a day-to-day basis? Except for truly famous consumer
product marks, such as the court's examples of COCA-COLA and
SINGER, 160 it seems doubtful. Under rule 201 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence, a court does not have free rein to make assumptions or
to speculate as to what a particular segment of the population might
think about a trademark.16 ' Judicially noticed facts tend to be of the
concrete variety: there is a large lake immediately east of the city of
Chicago; the Chicago Bulls won the NBA championship for the last
two years. These types of facts quite clearly are "not subject to reasonable dispute" within the meaning of rule 201.162 Nevertheless,
the fame of a trademark among discrete or highly specialized groups
157. 846 F.2d 727, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1719 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
158. B.V.D. Licensing Corp. v. Body Action Design, Inc., 846 F.2d 727, 728, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1719, 1720 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
159. Id
160. Id, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1720-21.
161. See FED. R. EvID. 201 (governing judicial notice of facts). Rule 201 provides:
Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts
(a) Scope of rule. This rule governs only judicial notice of adjudicative facts.
(b) Kinds of facts. Ajudicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable
dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the
trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources
whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.
(c) When discretionary. A court may take judicial notice, whether requested or
not.
(d) When mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice if requested by a party
and supplied with the necessary information.
(e) Opportunity to be heard. A party is entitled upon timely request to an opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor of the
matter noticed. In the absence of prior notification, the request may be made after
judicial notice has been taken.
(0 Time of taking notice. Judicial notice may be taken at any stage of the proceeding.
(g) Instructing jury. In a civil action or proceeding, the court shall instruct the
jury to accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed. In a criminal case, the court
shall instruct the jury that it may, but is not required to, accept as conclusive any fact
judicially noticed.
It

162.

See id 201(b) (providing criteria for taking judicial notice of facts).
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of purchasers, such as the fame of agricultural pesticides among
farmers or computer chips among computer professionals, is almost
certain not to rise to the level of what the court in B. VD. referred to
16 3
as "universal notoriety."
It is impossible to formulate a test for trademark fame that will
apply to each and every trademark dispute. Such disputes come in
every size, shape, and form, ranging from cases involving chewing
gum to those involving bulldozers. Yet, the Federal Circuit and the
Board have available at least one other approach that is a refinement
and possible clarification of the fifth DuPont factor. In anticipation
of the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, The United States
Trademark Association Trademark Review Commission proposed
adding a new section 43(c) to the Lanham Act for purposes of protecting famous registered marks from dilution. 16 4 The Commission
suggested the following nonexclusive factors to determine whether
a mark is famous:
(a) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the
mark;
(b) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection
with the goods and services;
(c) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the
mark;
(d) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the
mark is used;
(e) the channels of trade for the goods or services with which
the registrant's mark is used;
(f) the degree of recognition of the registrant's mark in its and
in the other's trading areas and channels of trade; and
(g) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar mark by
65
third parties.'
Would these elements aid the Federal Circuit and the Board in answering the question? In the absence of a litmus test for trademark
fame, they are the next best thing. With such a separate checklist
163. B.V.D., 846 F.2d at 728, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1720.
164. Trademark Review Comm'n, U.S. Trademark Ass'n, Report and Recommendation to
USTA President and Board of Directors, 77 TRADEMARK REP. 375, 458-59 (1987).
165. Id.; see also S. 1883, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. § 36 (1988) (proposing slightly different
version of Commission's factors as proper test for determining presence of fame element).
The proposals of the USTA and Congress largely parallel one another, although Congress did
not include a "channel of trade" factor distinct from "recognition in channels of trade," as the
USTA did. Compare S. 1883, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. § 36 (1988) (listing six factors used to
determine trademark fame) with Trademark Review Comm'n, U.S. Trademark Ass'n, supra

note 164, at 458-59 (including trade channel factor in addition to six factors in congressional
list). See generallyJerome Gilson, A FederalDilution Statute: Is It Time?, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 108
(Mar.-Apr. 1993).
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for fame replacing the fifth DuPont factor, these tribunals could review the evidence in a more methodical, orderly fashion than they
can with the skeletal DuPont elements. It is important to eliminate
guesswork as much as possible, and expanding DuPont in this fashion would be one way to do it.
III.

RELEVANT INDIVIDUAL PURCHASERS, THEIR SOPHISTICATION
AND PERCEPTIONS

A.

Electronic Design & Sales, Inc. v.
Electronic Data Systems Corp.

The Federal Circuit made another important contribution to likelihood of confusion law when it ruled in ElectronicDesign & Sales, Inc.
v. Electronic Data Systems Corp.166 that customer overlap depends on
the individual purchaser and not on his or her corporate employer. 167 Thus, the parties may have corporate customers in common, but unless the respective products are purchased by the same
persons within those companies, they are not likely to be
confused.168
In establishing this rule, the Federal Circuit adopted the reasoning of the First Circuit's Astra PharmaceuticalProducts v. Beckman Instruments.169 In Astra, the court noted that different hospital
departments make purchasing decisions independently of one another.1 7 0 Accordingly, the sale of trademarked goods to the same
hospitals is not necessarily evidence of overlapping customers because the individuals making the purchases may be different.' 7 1 In
following the lead of the First Circuit, the Federal Circuit appears to
have either adopted a new DuPont factor or modified the third factor. After Electronic Design, this factor could well be revised to read
"similarity or dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue trade
channels, especially the presence or absence of individual purchasers in common."
In Electronic Design, the Federal Circuit reversed the Board's decision sustaining an opposition and held that the Board's likelihood of
confusion conclusion was incorrect as a matter of law. 17 2 The Board
166. 954 F.2d 713, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1388 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
167. Electronic Design & Sales, Inc. v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 954 F.2d 713, 717, 21
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1388, 1391 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
168. Id.
169. 718 F.2d 1201, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 786 (1st Cir. 1983).
170. Astra Pharmaceutical Prods. v. Beckman Instruments, 718 F.2d 1201, 1206-07, 220
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 786, 790 (1st Cir. 1983).
171. Id.
172. ElectronicDesign, 954 F.2d at 715, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1389.
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had ruled that confusion would be likely between the applicant's
mark, EDS within a stylized box, for power supplies and battery
chargers, and the opposer's registered mark, EDS, for computer
programming services, including the design, implementation, and
management of electronic data processing programs and telecommunications services. 173 In the court's view, the Board did very little right. The Federal Circuit criticized the Board, stating that "the
Board failed to assess properly the differences in purchasers, channels of trade, and what each company sold, and overlooked the sophistication of the purchasers; that the Board accorded too much
weight to the renown and strength of Electronic Data's mark; and
174
that the Board's legal analysis was deficient."'
First, the court criticized the Board's finding that the applicant
sold some of its EDS goods to the same corporate customers that
purchased the opposer's EDS services because the Board did not
determine who the relevant purchasing individuals were within the
corporations. 175 The court ruled that although the two parties conducted business in the same field with some of the same corporate
customers, "the mere purchase of the goods and services of both
parties by the same institution does not, by itself, establish similarity
of the trade channels or overlap of customers." 176 The court noted
that individual departments within corporations could well operate
independently in their purchasing activities, and the selection of
goods or services could not be presumed to be made by the same
individuals. 177 Moreover, the court emphasized that the parties advertised in completely different media and exhibited at different
78
trade shows.'
Next, the Federal Circuit criticized the Board for failing to consider purchaser sophistication, the fourth DuPont factor. 179 The

court noted that the respective goods and services were costly and
purchased by experienced individuals only after careful consideration.' 80 Confusion hardly seemed likely.
Finally, the court found the Board erred in emphasizing the fame
of the opposer's mark.' 8 ' The court held that the opposer's sales
173.
op. at 7
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Electronic Data Sys. Corp. v. Electronic Design & Sales, Inc., Opp. No. 77,738, slip
(T.T.A.B. Sept. 5, 1990).
Electronic Design, 954 F.2d at 714, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1389.
Id at 716-18, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1391-92.
Id. at 717, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1391.
Id
Id
Id at 718, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1392.
Id
Id. at 719, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1393.
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and advertising for corporate computer services did not establish
fame outside that field, and that any fame existing in the field would
82
not carry over to specifically different and noncompeting goods.'
The court's decision pre-dated Kenner Parker by four months 83 and
clearly suggested that trademark fame is critical to enhanced protection only if the mark is in the same product or service field as the
opposite mark. As such, ElectronicDesign is distinguishable from Kenner Parker, where the respective products were in direct competition,1 4 and consistent with Marshall Field, where they were not. 185
Electronic Design can be expected to have an impact on interpartes

case litigation strategy. Even if an opposer can show that the applicant sells products under a similar mark to identical corporate customers, the opposer can expect the applicant to dig deep into the
opposer's corporate purchasing operations during discovery. Interrogatories, document requests, and depositions will no doubt pur-

sue detailed information on organizational charts and the specifics
of product purchasing.
B.

Ex Parte Appeals

In the three ex parte appeals from Trademark Trial and Appeal
Board affirmances of examiner rejections of applications to register
trademarks, the Board batted only .333. All three cases turned on
their specific facts, as such cases do, and stood as reminders that the
Federal Circuit acts very independently in reviewing Board decisions. The court also did not hesitate to apply very subjective
judgment.
In In re Hearst Corporation,1 8 6 the court was faced with the refusal to

register the trademark VARGA GIRL for calendars on the ground of
likelihood of confusion with the previously registered trademark
VARGAS for calendars and related products. 87 The Board re182.

Id.

183. Compare id, at 713, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1388 (stating that case was decided on
Jan. 8, 1992) with Kenner Parker Toys Inc. v. Rose Art Indus., Inc., 963 F.2d 350, 350, 22
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1453, 1453 (Fed. Cir.) (giving date of decision as Apr. 15, 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 181 (1992).
184. See Kenner Parker, 963 F.2d at 355, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1458 (stating that products and channels of trade were "practically identical"); supra notes 39-69, 74-79 and accompanying text (discussing Kenner Parker in detail).
185. See Marshall Field & Co. v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1323-24
(T.T.A.B. 1992) (finding that while marks applied to some similar bakery products, petitioner
only sold those products within its own department stores, whereas respondent's products
were on sale in bakeries standing alone and in other department store chains); supra notes 7073 and accompanying text (discussing court's decision in Marshall Field).
186. 982 F.2d 493, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1238 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
187. In re Hearst Corp., 982 F.2d 493, 493, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1238, 1238 (Fed. Cir.

1992).
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garded "Varga" as the salient element of the VARGA GIRL mark
and found that "girl" was merely descriptive and thus entitled to
little weight in comparing the mark with the VARGAS mark. 188
With a sense of nostalgia, harking back to the Esquire Magazine
drawings of the Varga Girl by Alberto Vargas during World War II,
the court applied the familiar trademark "entireties" rule.189 By giving so little weight to the "girl" component, the Board "inappropriately changed the mark." 190 The public would be likely to perceive
the mark VARGA GIRL in its entirety and not piecemeal, the court
reasoned, and thus not be likely to be confused with respect to the
VARGAS mark. 19 1 Likelihood of confusion under section 2(d) was
absent. 92 The court did not, in so many words, conjure up the image of the Varga Girl and the impact she made on the American
consciousness a half century ago, but her presence was felt. Because of its trademark comparison rationale, the Federal Circuit did
not reach Hearst's argument that the fame of its mark was not given
93
sufficient weight by the Board.'
In In re Amsted Industries Inc.,' 9 4 the Board also did not fare well.

The Federal Circuit reversed the Board's refusal to register as a
trademark the orange coloration of a plastic sheath that was slightly
shrunk around the applicant's wire rope, giving the sheath a textured surface. 195 The Board had refused registration under section
2(d) of the Lanham Act because of two prior registrations of marks
for wire rope.' 9 6 One of those marks consisted of a single orange
strand in a six-strand wire rope, and the second was a single orange
strand adjacent to a single black strand.' 9 7 In a very brief opinion,
the court faulted the Board for assuming that the marks covered
wire rope when in fact they covered only wire rope cladding.19 8 The
court distinguished the marks and considered the sophistication of
wire rope purchasers in holding that there would be no likelihood of
confusion between the marks. 199
188. Idl at 494, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1239.
189. See I GILSON, supra note 3,§ 5.03, at 5-49 (observing that likelihood of confusion
analysis requires that trademarks are compared in their entireties rather than as to their discrete elements or component parts).
190. Hearst Corp., 982 F.2d at 494, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1239.
191. Id
192. Id
193. lId

194. 972 F.2d 1326, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1067 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
195.

In re Amsted Indus. Inc., 972 F.2d 1326, 1326, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1067, 1067

(Fed. Cir. 1992).
196.
197.
198.
199.

Id. at 1326-27, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1067.
Id. at 1326, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1067.
Id. at 1327, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1068.
Id

1993]

FEDERAL CIRCUIT TRADEMARK ROUNDUP

1097

In the third ex parte case, In re Curtice-Burns Foods Inc.,200 the court

treated the Board more gently. The Board affirmed the examiner's
rejection of the application to register THE RIGHT STUFF for
"popped popcorn" because of the registered mark THE RIGHT
STUFF for "packaged foods consisting of sandwiches." '20 1 After a
scholarly discussion of the relationship of popcorn to sandwiches,
the court concluded that both were "relatively inexpensive comestibles, likely to be purchased without careful scrutiny. ' 20 2 It discounted a consumer survey designed to show that popcorn and
sandwiches are seldom consumed together. 203 Unfortunately for
the food industry and students of American eating habits, the specifics of the survey, such as the questions asked and the universe
polled, were not included in the opinion. 20 4 Doubt being resolved
against the newcomer, as it always is, confusion was found likely and
the refusal to register affirmed. 20 5
C. Kangol Ltd. v. KangaROOS U.S.A., Inc.
In Kangol Ltd. v. KangaROOS U.S.A., Inc. ,206 another brief decision,

it was not surprising that the Federal Circuit affirmed a decision of
the Board sustaining an opposition based on the mark KangaROOS
and a kangaroo design used on athletic shoes, sweat suits, and athletic shirts. 20 7 The application covered the mark KANGOL and a
kangaroo design for golf shirts. 20 8 The court agreed that the parties' goods were virtually identical and that although there were differences in the marks, the similarities outweighed the
dissimilarities. 20 9 The court noted that one feature of a mark may
be more obvious or dominant in determining likelihood of confusion and that such a feature should be given greater weight. 210 The
court determined that the consuming public was likely to perceive
the kangaroo design, an element common to both marks, as the
dominant feature. 211 The court confirmed that "likelihood of confusion must be determined from the perspective of the ordinary
200. 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1316 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (unpublished).
201. In re Curtice-Burns Foods Inc., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1316, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(unpublished).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. 974 F.2d 161, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1945 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
207. Kangol Ltd. v. KangaROOS U.S.A., Inc., 974 F.2d 161, 162, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1945, 1945 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
208. Id.
209. Id. at 163-64, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1945-46.
210. Id. at 163, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1946.
211. Id.
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consumer," rejected the applicant's arguments that golf shirts are
dissimilar to athletic shirts, and held that the goods traveled in the
2 12
same or similar trade channels.
IV.

GENERICNESS, MERE DESCRIPTIVENESS, AND PRIMARILY
GEOGRAPHICALLY DECEPTIVE MISDESCRIPTIVENESS AS A
BAR TO REGISTRATION

Section 2 of the Lanham Act, 213 enumerating bars to federal

trademark registration, is unique. Among federal statutes, the Lanham Act has one of the lengthiest tests to be applied by government
officials in the course of discharging their duties. A mark is disqualified from federal registration if, under section 2(e)(2) of the Act, it is
"primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive" of the goods
of the applicant. 2 14 But what does this mean? Is a mark disqualified
if it is not primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive, if it is
geographically misdescriptive but not deceptively so, or if it is deceptively misdescriptive for reasons other than its geographical connotations? Undaunted, the Federal Circuit faced the test squarely in
1992 in a case involving an application to register the mark CHABLIS WITH A TWIST for wines.
A.

Institut National des Appellations d'Origine v.
Vintners International Co.
In Institut National des Appellations d'Origine v. Vintners International
Co.,21 -5 the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board's dismissal of the Institute's opposition. 21 6 Vintners, a California wine producer, sought
registration of the mark, CHABLIS WITH A TWIST, for a citrus
flavored wine. 21 7 The Institute, a French wine industry organization
responsible for policing misuses of appellations of origin, filed an
opposition based on sections 2(a) and 2(e)(2) of the Lanham Act, 21 8
212. Id. at 163-64, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1946.
213. 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1988).
214. Id. § 1052(e)(2).
215. 958 F.2d 1574, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1190 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
216. Institut Nat'l des Appellations d'Origine v. Vintners Int'l Co., 958 F.2d 1574, 1575,
22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1190, 1191-92 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
217. Id., 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1191.
218. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a), (e) (1988)). The statute provides:
No trade-mark by which the goods of the applicant may be distinguished from the
goods of others shall be refused registration on the principal register on account of
its nature unless it(a) Consists of or comprises immoral, deceptive or scandalous matter; or matter
which may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons, living or dead,
institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute.
(e)

Consists of a mark which, (1) when used on or in connection with the goods
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and under a theory of trademark mutilation.2 19 On cross motions
for summary judgment, the Board denied Vintners' claim that the
Institute lacked standing to oppose. 2 20 The Board dismissed the
opposition on the grounds that the Institute failed to allege any genuine, triable issues of fact under sections 2(a) and 2(e)(2) and under
22
its trademark mutilation theory. '

One of the functions of the Institute was to maintain a system of
identifying French wine appellations of origin and to protect against

their misuse.222 The term "chablis," for example, refers to a city
and a geographic region in France, and is an appellation of origin

recognized under French law. 223 On the question of whether the
Institute had standing to bring an opposition, the court applied the
test set out in InternationalUnion v. Brock.2 24 Under Brock, an organization of members has standing if:
(a) [I]ts members would otherwise have standing to sue in their
own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the
organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the
relief requested requires the participation of individual members
in the lawsuit. 225
Finding Vintners' argument against the Institute's standing unpersuasive because it was aimed mainly toward the merits of registrability rather than at standing, the court found that the Institute
2 26
qualified under Brock to bring an action.
On the merits of the Institute's claim under sections 2(a) and
2(e)(2), the court began its analysis with the landmark case of In re
Nantucket 22 7 and its progeny. 2 28 Under the Nantucket doctrine, a
of the applicant is merely descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive of them, or (2)
when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant is primarily geographically descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive of them, except as indications of regional origin may be registrable under section 1054 of this title, or (3) is primarily
merely a surname.
15 U.S.C. § 1052(a), (e) (1988).
219. Institut Nat'l, 958 F.2d at 1575, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1191. Trademark mutilation
refers to registration of less than an entire trademark. Id. at 1582, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1197. In this case, the Institute argued that the absence of "California" in the trademark
constituted mutilation. Id
220. Id.
221. Id, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1191-92.
222. L at 1576, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1192.
223. Ia
224. 477 U.S. 274 (1986).
225. International Union v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274, 282 (1986).
226. Institut Nat'l, 958 F.2d at 1580, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1195.
227. 677 F.2d 95, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 889 (C.G.P.A. 1982).
228. See Institut Nat'l, 958 F.2d at 1580, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1195 (citing In re Societe
Generale Des Eaux Minerales de Vittel, S.A., 824 F.2d 957, 959, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1450,
1452 (Fed. Cir. 1987); In re Loew's Theatres, Inc., 769 F.2d 764, 767, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
865, 867 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re Nantucket, Inc., 677 F.2d 95, 98-99, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 889,
892-93 (C.C.P.A. 1982)).
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mark is "primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive" under
section 2(e)(2) when the mark's primary significance is a generally
known geographic place and when the public would make a goods/
place association, i.e., would believe that the goods in the application originate in that place. 2 29 In addition, a mark is deemed geographically deceptive under section 2(a) if it is primarily
geographically deceptively misdescriptive under section 2(e)(2) and
the geographic misrepresentation is material to the decision to
purchase the goods bearing the mark. 23 0 The court found that the
Board had correctly granted summary judgment on both counts. 23 1
The Institute relied primarily on regulations promulgated by the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (BATF) for protecting
the public against false or misleading labeling and advertising. 2 32
The regulations classified "chablis" as a type or class of wine with a
name connoting geographic significance. 23 3 The Institute argued
that "chablis," used as a component of a trademark for a nonFrench wine, must therefore create a misleading goods/place association. 23 4 Nevertheless, the Board ruled correctly that the term
"chablis" is a generic term for a type of wine. 2 35 The Federal Circuit explained that because the term is generic and because exclusive rights in the term were disclaimed by Vintners, it could not be
the reason that CHABLIS WITH A TWIST, when taken as a whole,
229. Nantucket, 677 F.2d at 98-99, 213 U.S.P.O. (BNA) at 892-93.
230. In re Budge Mfg. Co., 857 F.2d 773, 775, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1259, 1260 (Fed. Cir.
1988).
231. Institut Nat'l, 958 F.2d at 1582, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1196.
232. Id at 1580, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1195; see 27 C.F.R. § 4.24 (1992) (providing
regulations). The relevant BATF regulations provide:
(a) (1) A name of geographic significance which is also the designation of a class
or type of wine, shall be deemed to have become generic only if found so by the
Director.
(2) Examples of generic names, originally having geographic Aignificance,
which are designations for a class or type of wine are: Vermouth, Sake.
(b) (1) A name of geographic significance, which is also the designation ofa class
or type of wine, shall be deemed to have become semi-generic only if so found by the
Director. Semi-generic designations may be used to designate wines of an origin
other than that indicated by such name only if there appears in direct conjunction
therewith an appropriate appellation of origin disclosing the true place of origin of
the wine, and if the wine so designated conforms to the standard of identity, if any,
for such wine contained in the regulations in this part or, if there be no such standard, to the trade understanding of such class or type.
(2) Examples of semi-generic names which are also type designations for
grape wines are Angelica, Burgundy, Claret, Chablis, Champagne, Chianti, Malaga,
Marsala, Madeira, Moselle, Port, Rhine Wine (Syn. Hock), Sauterne, Haut Sauterne,
Sherry, Tokay.
27 C.F.R. § 4.24 (1992).
233. 27 C.F.R. § 4.24(b)(2) (1992).
234. Institut Nat'l, 958 F.2d at 1580, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1195.
235. Id. at 1581, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1196.
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was primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive. 23 6 In other
words, the Institute failed to prove that American wine purchasers
would believe that the product originated in the Chablis region of
France.2 3 7 The court agreed with the Board that the case presented
23 8
no genuine issue for determination.
Finally, the Federal Circuit addressed the issue of trademark mutilation. 2 39 The Institute argued that the mark sought to be registered, CHABLIS WITH A TWIST, did not correspond to the mark
used in commerce.2 40 It contended that the "California White
Wine" legend was a part of Vintners' trademark because it appeared
on labels in conjunction with the trademark and because it was required by the BATF regulations. 24 ' The court affirmed the Board's
decision that there was no mutilation, however, and agreed that the
BATF labeling requirement in no way mandated the inclusion of the
24 2
"California" legend in the Vintner mark.
B.

Loglan Institute, Inc. v. Logical Language Group, Inc.

In Loglan Institute, Inc. v. Logical Language Group, Inc.,243 the Federal
Circuit recognized that generic terms can never become trademarks
and that it is in the public interest to keep generic terms from becoming or continuing as registered trademarks. 244 The case contained both a human interest story about the invention of a new
language and the moral that even a coined name can be a generic
term from its inception. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board's
summary judgment decision holding that the LOGLAN mark for
dictionaries was generic and ordering that the registration of the
245
mark be canceled.
In 1955, Dr. James Brown invented a "logical language" designed
' 24 6
to "test the theory that natural languages limit human thought.
Called a "symbolic logic made speakable," the language was derived
from the eight most widely spoken natural languages and, accordingly, was culturally and politically neutral. 2 47 The language was
236. Il at 1581-82, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1196.
237. Id. at 1581, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1196.
238. Id. at 1582, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1196.
239. Id. at 1582-83, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1196-97.
240. Id. at 1582, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1197.
241. Id. at 1583, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1197.
242. Id at 1582-83, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1197.
243. 962 F.2d 1038, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
244. Loglan Inst., Inc. v. Logical Language Group, Inc., 962 F.2d 1038, 1042, 22
U.S.P.O.2d (BNA) 1531, 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
245. Id. at 1039, 22 U.S.P.O.2d (BNA) at 1532.
246. Id.
247. Id.
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also suitable for "cross-cultural linguistic experimentation. '2 48 Dr.
Brown coined the name "Loglan" (from logical language) for his
2 49
new language.
Dr. Brown first used the name in 1956, and in 1962 he formed the
250
Loglan Institute to promote the development and use of Loglan.
The Institute obtained its trademark registration in 1988, and that
year a disgruntled member left the Institute and formed the Logical
Language Group. 251 The Logical Language Group in turn produced a newsletter referring to Loglan. 25 2 It then petitioned to cancel the Institute's registration of LOGLAN after it received threats
of an infringement

lawsuit. 25 3

The Logical Language

Group

claimed that "Loglan" was merely a generic contraction of the name
25 4
"logical language," and the Board agreed.
The Federal Circuit noted that the issue of whether a term is generic poses a question of fact 2 55 and that the Lanham Act provides
for cancellation of a mark that is or has become generic for goods or
services. 2 56 The court explained that a registered mark is presumed
valid, but a cancellation petitioner may rebut the presumption by
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

Idl
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1039-40, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1532.
Id. at 1040, 22 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA) at 1532.
Id.
Id.
Id., 22 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA) at 1533.
Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (1988)). The statute provides:
A petition to cancel a registration of a mark, stating the grounds relied upon, may,
upon payment of the prescribed fee, be filed as follows by any person who believes
that he [or she] is or will be damaged by the registration of a mark on the principal
register established by this chapter, or under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act of
February 20, 1905:

(3) At any time if the registered mark becomes the generic name for the goods or
services, or a portion thereof, for which it is registered, or has been abandoned, or its
registration was obtained fraudulently or contrary to the provisions of section 1054
of this title or of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of section 1052 of this title for a registration under this chapter, or contrary to similar prohibitory provisions of such prior
Acts for a registration under such Acts, or if the registered mark is being used by, or
with the permission of, the registrant so as to misrepresent the source of the goods
or services on or in connection with which the mark is used. If the registered mark
becomes the generic name for less than all of the goods or services for which it is
registered, a petition to cancel the registration for only those goods or services may
be filed. A registered mark shall not be deemed to be the generic name of goods or
services solely because such mark is also used as a name of or to identify a unique
product or service. The primary significance of the registered mark to the relevant
public rather than purchaser motivation shall be the test for determining whether the
registered mark has become the generic name of goods or services on or in connection with which it has been used.
15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (1988).
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presenting evidence showing that the mark is used generically. 257
The primary consideration in such a case is the relevant public's
perception of the term and its meaning.2 58 Evidence of public perception may be derived from consumer testimony, surveys, dictionary listings, newspapers, and other publications. 25 9 In the court's
view, a survey, though frequently desirable to establish public perception, was unnecessary given the limited size of the relevant pub260
lic and the numerous usage examples introduced in evidence.
The evidence showed that Dr. Brown himself used the Loglan
term only in its generic sense in his speeches and writings. 26 1 Accordingly, the Federal Circuit ruled that, based on all the evidence
of record, the Board had correctly concluded that Dr. Brown and
the Loglan Institute adopted and used the term as the generic name
for the language. 2 62 Because language names are typically capitalized, e.g., French, German, and so on, capitalization did not weigh
26
against a finding of genericness. 3
Furthermore, the Federal Circuit rejected the Loglan Institute's
argument that the Logical Language Group had recognized and acquiesced to the Institute's rights in the Loglan term. 2 64 The court
agreed with the Board that acquiescence is rarely a valid defense
against a claim that a mark has become generic, because there is an
overriding public interest in canceling registrations for such
marks. 265 Finally, the court rejected the unclean hands, fraud, and
2 66
estoppel defenses.
C.

Bose Corp. v. International Jensen Inc.

In Bose Corp. v. InternationalJensen Inc.,267 the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board's dismissal of an opposition by Bose Corp., which
asserted that the mark ACOUSTIC RESEARCH was merely descriptive for audio speakers and turntables. 2 68 Bose submitted evidence
that the term had been used in a descriptive manner, but the Board
found that Bose failed to carry its burden of demonstrating that
257. Loglan Inst., 962 F.2d at 1040, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1533.
258. Id at 1041, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1533.
259. Id.
260. Id,
261. Id.
262. Id., 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1533-34.
263. Id. at 1041-42, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1534.
264. Id. at 1042, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1534.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. 963 F.2d 1517, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1704 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
268. Bose Corp. v. International Jensen Inc., 963 F.2d 1517, 1518, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1704, 1704 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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ACOUSTIC RESEARCH was merely descriptive of International
Jensen's goods. 2 69 Reviewing the Board's finding under the clearly
erroneous rule, the Federal Circuit agreed. 27 0
The court stated that the Board was not required to consider and
to make a specific finding regarding whether the mark ACOUSTIC
RESEARCH conveyed information about the goods. 2 7 ' The Federal Circuit reasoned that there are numerous tests that the Board
may use in determining whether a mark is merely descriptive, and
the fact situations are so varied that the Board should not be held to
any particular one or any type of formula.2 7 2 The court concluded
that the term at issue, when taken in its entirety, did not immediately convey information about a characteristic or a quality of the
products. 2 73 The fact that acoustic research is the first step in producing the products is not determinative of the mark's descriptiveness. 274 The Federal Circuit also rejected Bose's assertion that the
public must be free to use the words "acoustic research" to describe
2 75
the properties of audio goods.
V.

THE TIME FOR COMPUTING LACHES AND ESTOPPEL IN
OPPOSITIONS BEGINS AT PUBLICATION

In 1992 the Federal Circuit confirmed the viability of the doctrine
set forth in National Cable Television Association Inc. v. American Cinema
Editors, Inc.,276 which holds that the time for computing laches and
estoppel in an opposition proceeding begins at the time a mark is
published. 27 7 The court, however, applied an unusual variation of
the doctrine: an opposer cannot be found guilty of laches if its challenge to an applicant's use, years before its opportunity to oppose,
269. Bose Corp. v. InternationalJensen Inc., Opp. No. 76,754, slip op. at 5 (T.T.A.B. Feb.
12, 1991).
270. Bose Corp., 963 F.2d at 1519-20, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1706.
271. Id at 1519, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1706.
272. Id. at 1519-20, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1706.
273. Id. at 1520, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1706.
274. Id.
275. Id. In fact, International Jensen admitted that Bose could use the term "acoustic
research" in a descriptive manner to advertise its research efforts in acoustics. Id., 22
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1706-07.
276. 937 F.2d 1572, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1432 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
277. National Cable Television Ass'n, Inc. v. American Cinema Editors, Inc., 937 F.2d
1572, 1580-81, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1424, 1432 (Fed. Cir. 1991). The court in National Cable
should definitely have modified the tenth DuPont factor, part (d), to read: "laches and estoppel attributable to owner of prior mark and commencing with the publication or registration
of the mark." See supra note 8 (listing DuPont factors). The last phrase, "indicative of lack of
confusion," should have been made a separate subpart beginning "side-by-side use of the
mark."
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is met by the applicant's claim of prior rights. 2 78
In Lincoln Logs Ltd. v. Lincoln Pre-CutLog Homes, Inc. ,279 the Federal
Circuit upheld the Board's summary judgment rejection of the applicant's laches defense because there was no unreasonable delay in
the assertion of rights by the opposer, Lincoln Logs. 2 0 Lincoln
Pre-Cut applied to register the mark THE ORIGINAL LINCOLN
LOGS LTD. and design for prefabricated homes, and Lincoln Logs
opposed the application, asserting a likelihood of confusion of that
mark with its registered mark LINCOLN for essentially the same
28 1
goods.
Lincoln Logs had sent a cease and desist letter to Lincoln Pre-Cut
regarding a substantially similar mark in 1984, but did not oppose
the applied-for mark until 1988.282 In Lincoln Pre-Cut's response
to the 1984 cease and desist letter, however, Lincoln Pre-Cut stated
28 3
that it had priority of use of the similar mark over Lincoln Logs.
In affirming the grant of summary judgment for Lincoln Logs after a
de novo review, the court held:
Opposer cannot be held guilty of unreasonable delay in failing to
take action to protect its rights if he had no rights to protect vis-avis Applicant at that time. Thus, the defense of laches fails because there was no delay in assertion of paramount rights by Opposer. In 1984, Opposer's rights were then limited to rights
based on common law and were subservient to Applicant's rights,
28 4
if we take Applicant at its word.
The court also rejected the Lincoln Pre-Cut argument that the
mark that was alleged to infringe in 1984 was the legal equivalent of
the mark it sought to register, therefore allowing Lincoln Pre-Cut to
"tack" onto the prior mark. 28 5 The court agreed with the Board's
conclusion that the two marks did not meet the strict test of legal
equivalency: the marks must create the same continuing commercial impression, and the later mark cannot materially differ from or
28 6
alter the character of the previous mark.
More significantly, the court underscored the federal policy in
278. Lincoln Logs Ltd. v. Lincoln Pre-Cut Log Homes, Inc., 971 F.2d 732, 735-36, 23
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1701, 1704 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
279. 971 F.2d 732, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1701 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
280. Lincoln Logs Ltd. v. Lincoln Pre-Cut Log Homes, Inc., 971 F.2d 732, 733-35, 23
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1701, 1703-04 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
281. Id at 733, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1702.
282. Id. at 733-34, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1702-03.
283. Id at 734, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1703.
284. Id at 735, 23 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA) 1704.
285. Id.
286. Id
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favor of encouraging registration of trademarks. 28 7 The court explained that Lincoln Pre-Cut, as prior user, could have prevented
Lincoln Logs from registering the trademark LINCOLN initially or
could have petitioned to cancel the registration within five years. 288
Because Lincoln Pre-Cut failed to pursue either of these options, it
was not entitled to a very sympathetic view of its case. 2 89
VI.

APPEALS FROM DISTRICT COURTS

A.

Standing

In U.S. Philips Corp. v. Windmere Corp.,290 the Federal Circuit ruled
that the mere inclusion of the name of a party on an official case
caption does not establish standing. 29 1 During the pendency of the
appeal from the Southern District of Florida in a patent and trade
dress case, Phillips and Windmere entered into a settlement agreement pursuant to which they filed a joint motion to dismiss the appeal and vacate the judgment. 29 2 Izumi, a codefendant with
Windmere, opposed the motion to dismiss insofar as the motion requested vacating the judgment. 2 93
Izumi claimed standing as an appellee, pointing out that it was a
party before the district court and that its name was included in the
Federal Circuit caption. 2 94 The court noted that although Izumi was
indeed on the caption, it was not a party to the appeal because it did
not file an appearance or a certificate of interest. 295 The court concluded that "inclusion on the 'official caption' does not establish status as a party before this Court. ' 29 6 The court therefore vacated the
appeal, noting that Izumi did not seek intervention pursuant to rule
24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure orjoinder under rules 19
or 20.297

B.

Trademark Infringement and Unfair Competition

In Charles Greiner & Co. v. Mari-Med Manufacturing,Inc. ,298 the Fed287. Id. at 736, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1704.
288. Id. at 735-36, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1704.
289. Id.
290. 971 F.2d 728, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1709 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
291. U.S. Philips Corp. v. Windmere Corp., 971 F.2d 728, 730, 23 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA)
1709, 1710 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
292. Id293. Id
294. IE
295. Id
296. Id297. Id. at 730-31, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1710-11.
298. 962 F.2d 1031, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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eral Circuit heard the appeal of a patent infringement, trademark
infringement, and unfair competition case on appeal from the U.S.
District Court for the District of Rhode Island. 2 99 The district court
held that the defendants did not infringe the patent or the trademark at issue and that the plaintiffs had not proved unfair competition.3 0 0 The Federal Circuit affirmed. 3 0 l
The case involved cervical collars used to treat spinal injuries.30 2
The plaintiff claimed protection of a cervical collar made of two mating halves, as embodied in U.S. Patent No. 3,756,226.303 In addition, the plaintiff claimed trademark protection in the designation
PHILADELPHIA CERVICAL COLLAR.3 04 The defendant referred
to its collar as a "Philly Collar" and defendant's distributors referred to the collar as a "Philly-Type Collar," "Philly-Style Collar,"
or a "Generic Philadelphia Collar."3 0 5 The district court held that
the plaintiff did not show that the defendant intended to misuse the
plaintiff's mark, nor was there any substantial evidence of
3 06
confusion.
The Federal Circuit found that the district court did not err either
in concluding lack of infringement or in holding that the defendant
was not liable for inducing its distributors to infringe.3 0 7 The court
noted that the test for trademark inducement liability is whether "a
manufacturer or distributor intentionally induces another to infringe a trademark, or [whether] it continues to supply its product to
one whom it knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark
infringement. " 3' 0 8 Finally, the Federal Circuit rejected the plaintiff's
unfair competition claim under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.3 0 9
The plaintiff claimed that the defendant appropriated the cervical
collar trade dress and caused likelihood of confusion, but the Federal Circuit ruled that the shape of the cervical collar was functional
and that the plaintiff therefore had no enforceable rights.3 1 0
299. Charles Greiner & Co. v. Mari-Med Mfg., Inc., 962 F.2d 1031, 1032, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1526, 1527 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
300. Charles Greiner & Co. v. Mari-Med Mfg., Inc., 754 F. Supp. 951, 954, 956-58 (D.R.I.
1991), aff'd, 962 F.2d 1031, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
301. Charles Greiner, 962 F.2d at 1032, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1527.
302. Id
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 1037, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1530-31.
306. Charles Greiner, 754 F. Supp. at 957-58.
307. Charles Greiner, 962 F.2d at 1037-38, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1530-31.
308. Idoat 1037, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1531.
309. Id. at 1038, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1531.
310. Id.

1108

THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
VII.

[Vol. 42:1071

CONCLUSION

In the 1992 world of trademark law, the Federal Circuit deserves
high marks. Although its docket of appeals from the Trademark
Trial and Appeal Board lacks the excitement of appeals in civil actions (with "sexy" issues involving damage awards, jury verdicts,
and draconian injunctions), the court's trademark law influence continues to rise. For example, the court and its predecessor have led
the way in developing the role and application of the functionality
doctrine in trade dress cases, as is evident from the decisions cited
by the Reporters for the American Law Institute's Restatement (Third)
of Unfair Competition.31 1 Moreover, Kenner Parkerand its progeny will
undoubtedly have an influence on other courts, and possibly on
Congress as well. There are stirrings abroad on the subject of adding a trademark dilution cause of action to the Lanham Act, 12 and
the fame of the mark alleged to have had its distinctiveness diluted
will be central to any such analysis.
But why does the Federal Circuit not take a greater leadership
role in critically reviewing and revising the DuPont checklist from
time to time? Although courts should not become legislatures and
should not straightjacket themselves with hard and fast Restatementlike rules, modest changes to DuPontwould be of great benefit to the
trademark bar and the public. Explicit modification would increase
the predictability of case outcomes, would enhance the ability of
lawyers to advise their clients, and would facilitate settlements in
trademark disputes. DuPont has worked well for two decades, but a
fresh approach to it in 1993 and beyond would definitely enhance
the trademark law leadership role and influence of the Federal
Circuit.

311. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1990)
(citing numerous Federal Circuit decisions in comments on doctrine of functionality).
312. See Gilson, supra note 165 (manuscript at 14-16, on file with The American University
Law Review) (discussing recent momentum in favor of federal dilution statute).

